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Abstract Recently, the study of structured populations using models of evo-
lutionary processes on graphs has begun to incorporate a more general type
of interaction between individuals, allowing multi-player games to be played
among the population. In this paper, we develop a birth-death dynamics for
use in such models and consider the evolution of populations for special cases
of very small graphs where we can easily identify all of the population states
and carry out exact analyses. To do so, we study two multi-player games, a
Hawk-Dove game and a public goods game. Our focus is on finding the fixation
probability of an individual from one type, cooperator or defector in the case
of the public goods game, within a population of the other type. We compare
this value for both games on several graphs under different parameter values
and assumptions, and identify some interesting general features of our model.
In particular there is a very close relationship between the fixation probability
and the mean temperature, with high temperatures helping fitter individuals
and punishing unfit ones and so enhancing selection, whereas low temperatures
give a levelling effect which suppresses selection.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Modelling structured populations with multi-player interactions
The modelling of the evolution of a population of individuals where each is
located on the vertex of a graph, interacting with their neighbours and poten-
tially replacing them with a direct copy of themselves, is commonly termed
evolutionary graph theory (although it is the population and not the graph
which evolves), and studies how the structure of this population, i.e. its topol-
ogy, can affect its evolution (Lieberman et al, 2005; Antal and Scheuring,
2006; Nowak, 2006; Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2008; Voorhees and Murray, 2013;
Maciejewski et al, 2014). As opposed to traditional evolutionary game the-
ory that mainly considers infinite well-mixed populations, the use of graphs to
model population structure on standard games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the Hawk-Dove game enables us to work on finite inhomogeneous popula-
tions (Ohtsuki et al, 2006; Santos and Pacheco, 2006; Hadjichrysanthou et al,
2011). This follows earlier work considering finite and/or spatial populations;
for example Nowak and May (1992, 1993) considered the spatial evolution of
cooperative behaviour, Schaffer (1988) considered a Hawk-Dove game in a fi-
nite population, and Killingback and Doebeli (1996) considered a Hawk-Dove
game on a lattice.
This approach, however, is still limited in the sense that it is restricted to
pairwise interactions between individuals. Animals of many species live alone
or in distinct groups on a certain territory. Although animals generally forage
for food within their territory, it can happen that the territory size varies
considerably over time. In some cases, it can expand and overlap with other
territories, when food becomes rarer, or for the purpose of mating for example.
Thus the same place is used by two or more individuals that will interact and
sometimes compete when some major items of food are at stake. This kind of
situation illustrates the need for models of evolution on structured population
to incorporate a more general type of interaction, not only based on pairwise
interactions, but also allowing multi-player games to be played among the
population.
In general there are many situations where groups of more than two indi-
viduals form to cooperate, or to compete. Groups form to fight over food, e.g.
in African wild dogs (Ginsberg and Macdonald, 1990) or roadrunners (Kel-
ley et al, 2011). Ant colonies are large cooperative enterprises, and similarly
primate groups are cooperative structures, containing conflicts related to dom-
inance and resource division. Human society is of course full of examples. Thus
it is natural to generalise evolutionary games to more than two individuals.
Multi-player games were introduced into biology in Palm (1984) and the the-
ory developed by Broom et al (1997), see also Bukowski and Miekisz (2004).
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Fig. 1: The territorial raider model from Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2012). (a) In-
dividual In lives in place Pn but can visit neighbouring places. The territory
of I1 consists of all places P1, P2, P3 and P4, the territory of I2 consists of P1
and P2, the territory of I3 consists of P1 and P3, the territory of P4 consists
of P1 and P4. (b) An alternative visualization as multi-player interactions on
a bi-partite graph where individuals and places are clearly separated. We will
call the vertices I1, . . . In the I-vertices.
Such general multi-player games have been studied recently, see for example
Gokhale and Traulsen (2010), Gokhale and Traulsen (2014) and (Broom and
Rychta´rˇ, 2013, Chapter 9). A multi-player Hawk-Dove game was considered
in Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2012), and multi-player Public Goods games were
considered in a number of papers: Hauert et al (2002), Milinski et al (2006),
Santos et al (2008), Kurokawa and Ihara (2009), Souza et al (2009), Santos and
Pacheco (2011), van Veelen and Nowak (2012), Kurokawa and Ihara (2013).
In order to model this more general type of interaction between individuals,
Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2012) developed a new framework to analyse multi-player
games in networks involving groups of different sizes. However, their work is
mainly focused on the static analysis of such games. In this study, we are
interested in introducing dynamics. We want to analyse this framework on
models as simple as possible, and we hope to obtain some general insights by
studying the games’ dynamics.
1.2 The population and its distribution: the territorial raider model
Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2012) used the territorial raider model (see Figure 1),
to represent interactions within a population with overlapping territories. We
shall briefly describe it again below. We consider a population of N individuals
I1, . . . , IN (see also Section 2.2 for an interpretation of In in relation to the
evolutionary dynamics) who can move and eventually interact in N different
places P1, . . . , PN , see Figure 1(a). The individual In lives in a place Pn and can
also move to neighbouring places. We model the population with a graph where
vertices represent individuals as well as places of interaction. We assume that
individuals move independently of each other and also independently of the
population’s history (any past movements). The probability of an individual
In being at place Pm will be denoted by pnm.
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2 General framework
Using the general framework described by Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2012), we are
interested in studying the dynamics of standard games under the territorial
raider model, which as we have seen can be represented as a simple graph (see
Figure 1). We wish to see if we can get some insight into the effect of the graph
on the evolution of a lone mutant introduced into the population. In (almost)
any finite population comprised of two classes of individuals, eventually one
type will come to completely dominate the population. The fixation probability
of a single mutant is the probability that eventually it will completely replace
the other type. Some graphs can act as suppressors or amplifiers of evolution
(see Lieberman et al, 2005); a graph is a suppressor (amplifier) of evolution
if a rare mutant which has fitness higher than the resident population has a
smaller (larger) fixation probability on the graph than in the corresponding
well-mixed population.
Let us consider a population of individuals of type A and B set on the
vertices of a graph. Each individual can move along the edges of this graph
and meet one or more other individuals in this process. Each time a group is
formed, individuals within this group play a game so that each individual gets
a reward according to the outcome of the game for each player. At one point,
a dynamic process enables the population to evolve through a birth-death
process based on the individuals’ fitness, and we are interested in expressing
the fixation probability of one individual in this process.
2.1 Spatial structure
The graphs that we will study are representations of territorial raider models.
Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that they relate to a more general
representation where places and individuals are disconnected as shown in Fig-
ure 1(b). In other words, the graphs shown here stands for the kind of models
in Figure 1(a). We will consider all of the three and four vertex connected
undirected graphs shown in Figure 2.
In general each individual could have a different probability of movement,
but we select a natural model where all movements are governed by a single
parameter. We assume that an individual with d neighbours will stay with
probability h/(h+d) and move to one of its neighbour with probability 1/(h+
d). Thus h is a measure of the preference of an individual to stay on its home
vertex, and we call this its home fidelity. In each case setting h = 1 gives the
natural parameters of each individual visiting all allowable places (including
its home vertex) with equal probability.
2.2 Evolutionary dynamics
To calculate the fixation probability of A among B individuals at a given spa-
tial structure, the first step is to list all the states that describe all the possible
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Fig. 2: The population structures and movement probabilities for small graphs
on 3 and 4 vertices. An individual moves to a neighbouring vertex with prob-
ability 1/(h+ d) and stays at home with probability h/(h+ d) where d is the
number of neighbours. (a) The line of 3 vertices, which in this case, is also the
star. (b) the triangle. (c) the square with both diagonals, the complete graph
for four vertices. (d) the “circle” graph, or a square with no diagonals. (e) the
star graph with 4 vertices. (f) the diamond, a square with one diagonal. (g)
the line with 4 vertices. (h) the paw.
distributions of individuals of both types on the different places throughout
the evolutionary process, from the insertion of one individual from type A in
a population made up of B individuals until its fixation or elimination.
The evolutionary process then determines if the population can move from
one state to another. Here we consider a birth-death dynamics where during
each time step, one individual is selected with probability proportional to its
fitness to produce a copy of itself, and another individual is selected to be
replaced by the copy.
An individual Ij can be replaced by a copy of individual Ii if and only if Ii
and Ij could meet in the spatial structure (which here means that Pi and Pj
are at most two edges apart from each other). Thus the types of the individuals
change through time, and so Ii is more properly thought of as a position in
our structure which has a particular relationship to the places P1, . . . , PN ,
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Fig. 3: The transition graphs for small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices. (a) The line
of 3 vertices. (b) the triangle. (c) the square with both diagonals, the complete
graph for four vertices. (d) the “circle” graph, or a square with no diagonals.
(e) the star graph with 4 vertices. (f) the diamond, a square with one diagonal.
(g) the line with 4 vertices. (h) the paw.
rather than an actual individual. The relationship between the position Ii and
the potential individuals that can be thought of as similar to that between
a gene and its possible alleles. We shall call the positions In the I-vertices
of our structure, but will often simply refer to them as “individuals”, unless
this distinction needs to be emphasised (see Figure 1(b)). Figure 3 shows the
transition graphs (when all graph symmetries are taken into account) for the
corresponding graphs from Figure 2.
Not accounting for the symmetries, a given population structure with N
individuals yields a transition graph with 2N different states that can be in-
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dexed by subsets S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}. We will use the convention that state ∅
represents a population composed entirely of B individuals, and state N a
population of A individuals only. Let PSS′ denote the transition probability
from state S to state S′ in the dynamic process of our game.
Let bi denote the probability an individual Ii is selected for reproduction
and let dij , for i 6= j, denote the probability that Ij is replaced by a copy of
Ii given Ii is selected for reproduction. For S 6= S
′, we have
PSS′ =


∑
i 6∈S
bidij ; if S
′ = S \ {j} for some j ∈ S
∑
i∈S
bidij ; if S
′ = S ∪ {j} for some j 6∈ S
0; otherwise
(1)
and we set
PSS = 1−
∑
S′ 6=S
PSS′ , (2)
We calculate bi as being proportional to Fi, the fitness of individual Ii (see
(17) in Section 3.4 for how we calculate fitness), i.e.
bi =
Fi∑
k Fk
. (3)
We calculate dij by considering all possible places Pm and all possible groups
G ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} involving both individuals i and j; weighted by χ(m,G), the
probability of the group G meeting at place Pm, and by a factor (|G| − 1)
−1
representing the fact that in a group G, an individual Ii could replace any one
of |G| − 1 other individuals. Thus, we get
dij =
N∑
m=1
∑
G
i,j∈G
χ(m,G)
|G| − 1
, where (4)
χ(m,G) =
∏
k∈G
pkm
∏
k′ 6∈G
(1− pk′m); (5)
here pkm is the probability of Ik moving to Pm, so for example for an individual
at the centre of a star the probability that it goes to its ‘home” vertex is
p11 = h/(h+ 3) (see Figure 2e). We note that dji = dij . Also, the quantity
Tj =
∑
i 6=j
dij (6)
could be regarded as the temperature (Lieberman et al, 2005) of the I-vertex
Ij as it is proportional to the frequency of an individual Ij being replaced by
another individual (if all individuals are equally likely to produce an offspring).
We note that in our setting, the (mean) temperature depends not only on the
graph but also on the parameter h, see Figure 4.
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Fig. 4: The average temperatures as given by (6) for small graphs on 3 and 4
vertices. The average temperature for Line(3), Star(4) and paw monotonically
decrease with h, the average temperature for other graphs peaks around h ≈ 1
for other graphs.
2.3 The fixation probability of A
Finally, let ρAS be the probability that A fixate from state S. We get,
ρAS =
∑
S′⊂{1,2,...,N}
PSS′ρ
A
S′ (7)
with boundary conditions
ρA∅ = 0, (8)
ρAN = 1. (9)
The mean fixation probability of A, ρA, will be an appropriately weighted
average of the fixation probabilities from all states including exactly one indi-
vidual of type A. Following Allen and Tarnita (2014), we define
ρA =
∑
i
Ti∑
j
Tj
ρA{i}, (10)
which is grounded in the fact that a new type of individual is more likely
to appear at a place whose inhabitants are replaced more often (relative to
others). We note, however, that the difference between ρA and the uniformly
weighted average
∑
i
1
N
ρA{i} is negligible for all the small graphs we considered.
In fact, the latter quantity is never less than ρA which is in agreement with
results from Allen et al (2014).
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3 The multi-player games
In this section we summarize two multi-player games, the Hawk-Dove game,
and the Public Goods game. We also introduce the payoffs for the fixed fitness
case, which can be seen as a limiting case in our framework.
3.1 The Hawk-Dove game
Let us consider a population of two types of individuals, A stands for a Hawk,
and B for a Dove. They both start with a background payoff R, in addition to
playing a multi-player Hawk-Dove game, competing for a single reward V that
is placed on each vertex of our graph. If all individuals in the group are Doves,
they split the reward so that each one gets the same share. If there is at least
one Hawk, all the Doves concede and the remaining Hawks fight, so that the
winner gets the reward V while the others receive a cost C. Therefore, after
one game within a group of a Hawks and b Doves, the average payoffs for the
Hawk and the Dove are respectively
RAa,b = R+
V − (a− 1)C
a
, (11)
RBa,b =
{
R, if a > 0,
R+ V
b
, if a = 0.
(12)
In what follows, we will be interested in the fixation probability of a single
Hawk in a population of Doves as well as in a fixation probability of a single
Dove in a population of Hawks.
3.2 The Public Goods game
Let us consider a population of two types of individuals, A stands for a Co-
operator, and B for a Defector. They both start with a background payoff R,
representing fitness gained from sources other than the game, in addition to
playing a multi-player Public Goods game. Following for example van Veelen
and Nowak (2012), a Cooperator (always) pays a cost C so that other indi-
viduals in the group share the benefit V . Therefore, after one game within a
group of a Cooperators and b Defectors, the average payoffs for the Cooperator
and the Defector are respectively
RAa,b =
{
R− C, a = 1, b = 0,
R− C + a−1
a+b−1V, otherwise,
(13)
RBa,b = R+
a
a+ b− 1
V. (14)
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3.3 Fixed fitness case
In this game, the individuals do not really interact with each other but rather
receive a constant payoff depending on their type and irrespective of the groups
size or types of the other group members. Specifically, if a group consists of a
individuals of type A and b individuals of type B, we define
RAa,b = R+ V, (15)
RBa,b = R. (16)
3.4 Fitness
For simplicity, we assume that the fitness of an individual is the average (equiv-
alently total, since all individuals play the same number of games) payoff from
the games. This corresponds to the scenario where individuals first undergo
a large number of independent movements, acquiring the average (or total)
payoff from the games that are played during this process, and then move
one more time to form groups, but in this case, no game is played, only the
reproduction (proportional to the acquired payoff) and replacement processes
take place.
The fitness of an individual Ii is thus given by
Fi =
∑
m
∑
G
i∈G
χ(m,G)Ri,G, (17)
where Ri,G is the fitness of individual Ii in group G. Ri,G depends on the state
S (in particular on the type of individual Ii and the types of individuals in
G).
At one point (after a number of games), one individual is chosen for repro-
duction with probability proportional to its fitness bi, as given in (3). Next,
a copy of individual Ii replaces an individual Ij with probability dij given in
(4).
Note that the background payoff R has no effect in static games, but is
important for our dynamics. In general for discrete dynamics, including the one
we consider here, the larger the value of R, the weaker the effect of evolution
(see e.g. Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2013, Chapter 2). Here, we always assume R is
sufficiently large that no fitness can ever go negative.
On the other hand, scaling all payoffs by a constant has no effect on the
game outcomes, as the numerator and denominator from (3) are both divided
by the same constant, and so we only need to consider the reduced parameters
v = V/C and r = R/C. In the following, we will set the reduced background
fitness r equal to 10. Figure 5 shows a series of plots using this model with v
varying from 0 to 2.
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Fig. 5: The fixation probabilities of a single Hawk in a population of Doves for
small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices.
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Fig. 6: The fixation probabilities of a single Dove in a population of Hawks for
small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices.
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Fig. 7: The fixation probabilities of a single Cooperator in a population of
Defectors for small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices.
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Fig. 8: The fixation probabilities of a single Defector in a population of Coop-
erators for small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices.
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4 Results
For the Hawk-Dove game, the results for the fixation probabilities of Hawks
on small graphs are shown in Figure 5. The fixation probabilities of Doves on
small graphs are shown in Figure 6. For the Public Goods game, the results for
the fixation probabilities of Cooperators on small graphs are shown in Figure 7
and the fixation probabilities of Defectors are shown in Figure 8. The fixation
probability ρA, depends on the underlying graph structure, the home fidelity
parameter h, the game and the parameters of the game v (the parameter r was
fixed at 10), as well as the type of the invading individual/ resident population.
There are a number of features common to both games, and both types of
invading mutant within the Hawk-Dove game. The fixation probability in each
case naturally depends upon the size of the reward, and the strength of this
dependency itself depends upon h. For low values of h, which have a high mean
temperature, there is a wide spread of values of fixation probability depending
upon the value of v. For high h, corresponding to low mean temperature, the
fixation probability depends very little upon v. This can be seen from Figure
10, where the biggest differences between fixation probabilities are for the
highest temperatures. In Hawk-Dove game, a large v is good for Hawks, and
a small v is good for Doves (since Hawks still pay costs against other Hawks)
and the effect of changing v is most profound when the temperature is highest.
In general we see that low temperatures suppress the effect of fitness and thus
suppress selection, whereas high temperatures enhance it.
4.1 Fixation probability, temperature and mean group size
In previous work, see for example Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2012); Bruni et al
(2014), the authors studied the mean size of an individual’s group (the group
size from the individual’s perspective) defined by
G =
∑
m
∑
G
χ(m,G)|G|2∑
m
∑
G
χ(m,G)|G|
. (18)
Note the distinction between (18) and the mean group size from an observer’s
perspective, as here we weight the groups by the number of individuals within
a group. For example, if half of groups are of size 6 and half are of size 12, from
the observer’s perspective the mean group size is 9, but from the individual’s
perspective this is 10, as 2/3 of individuals are in the larger groups.
In Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2012) it was observed that the mean group size was
an important factor affecting the fitness, and we thus expected that this would
be the case for the fixation probability too. In fact this is so, but it turns out
that the mean temperature and the mean group size are strongly correlated,
see Figure 9, and the effect of the mean group size on the fixation probability
is less strong than that of the mean temperature, and hence we have focused
on the mean temperature in the discussion of our results. We can see that ρA
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Fig. 9: The mean temperature versus the mean group size for graphs with
4 vertices (as h varies from 0 to 100). For complete graphs, the line with 4
vertices and the diamond, i.e. the graphs where the mean temperature peaks
at h ≈ 1, there is a spike in the correlation figure corresponding to the fact
that the mean temperature and the mean group size increase (decrease) at
different speeds as h < 1 (or h > 1). Note that Star(4) has the largest possible
mean group size.
strongly correlates with the mean temperature for the underlying graphs as
shown at Figure 10. The correlation is negative for the Public Goods game and
ranges from positive to negative as v decreases for Hawks in the Hawk-Dove
game or increases for Doves in Hawk-Dove game.
4.2 High home fidelity h
For low temperatures, the relationship between mean temperature and fixation
probability is effectively linear, although this linear dependence breaks down
for high temperatures, and breaks down fast for larger or more heterogeneous
graphs like the star with 7 vertices, see Figure 10.
For example consider the case of the complete graph, where every I-vertex
has the same temperature, which we denote below simply by T . In this case
the fixation probability is given by the standard formula (see e.g Karlin and
Taylor, 1975; Traulsen and Hauert, 2009)
ρA =
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
, (19)
where γk is the ratio of the probability of a decrease in the number of type A
individuals and the probability of an increase in that number (given there are
currently k type A individuals). Since dij = dji, in this case γk = bA,k/bB,k =
FA,k/FB,k, where the latter expressions are the ratios of the birth probabilities
of types B and A and the fitnesses of types B and A (that depends on k but
does not depend on position).
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For both games this is the ratio of two terms that are approximately linear
in the I-vertex temperature, when this temperature is low, as we show below.
Any individual is only likely to be with at most one other individual, and a
payoff above the baseline will only occur if this is a cooperator (each with
probability roughly 1/h). The temperature at each I-vertex is approximately
(N − 1)/h. Recalling that the (reduced) background fitness and reward values
are denoted by r and v, respectively, if type A is a Cooperator in the Public
Goods game, we obtain
FA,k ≈ r − 1 +
(k − 1)v
h
≈ r − 1 +
k − 1
N − 1
vT, (20)
FB,k ≈ r +
kv
h
≈ r +
k
N − 1
vT. (21)
For sufficiently small temperatures, it is thus clear that γk is approximately
linear in the mean temperature, and so consequently we can see that the fix-
ation probability will also be approximately linear in the mean temperature,
although this linearity breaks down as soon as the temperature becomes suf-
ficiently large.
For the fixed fitness case, we can actually see the situation from the point of
view of classical evolutionary graph theory (Lieberman et al, 2005). No matter
what our underlying population structure, we can construct an evolutionary
graph W with the vertices given by the set of I-vertices {Ii; i = 1, . . . N}
and the edges between Ii and Ij weighted by wij = dij corresponding to
the fact that Ij is being replaced by Ii with probability dij . Since dij = dji,
the resulting evolutionary graph W is a circulation (Lieberman et al, 2005,
Appendix). Consequently, type A, having a relative fitness (r + v)/r when
compared to type B, will fixate with the Moran probability (Moran, 1958)
ρA = PMoran
(
r + v
r
)
=
1− r
r+v
1−
(
r
r+v
)N . (22)
The above results hold for any graph and the fixed fitness case; and it
holds approximately for any graph and any game where the payoffs of different
types of individuals are nearly constant. Within our framework, this happens
if h → ∞ because then the individuals rarely move and thus rarely interact.
For the Public Goods game, it also happens if v → 0. In this case, Cooperators
receive payoff r − 1 while Defectors receive payoffs r, resulting in
ρA = PMoran
(
r − 1
r
)
=
1− r
r−1
1−
(
r
r−1
)N . (23)
For r = 10 and N = 4, we thus get PMoran ≈ 0.2119 which corresponds to
our results for h → ∞ or v → 0 as seen in Figure 11. For the Hawk-Dove
game, as h → ∞, the fitnesses of both the Hawk and the Dove tend to r as
the individuals rarely meet. Thus, the fixation probability of either Hawk or
a Dove tends to 1/N as h→∞ as seen in Figures 5 and 6.
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Fig. 10: The fixation probability as a function of the mean temperature for
various graphs. For all small graphs, the correlations look similar and depend
primarily on the game played.
Note that for the Hawk-Dove game, when v → 0 but h is not too large,
the fixation probability of Hawks and Doves is not 1/N . This is caused by the
fact that Hawks still interact and thus have a disadvantage over Doves. The
disadvantage grows with growing mean group size (i.e. with growing mean tem-
perature). Consequently, the fixation probability is not the Moran probability
if h≪∞.
Dynamics of multi-player games on networks 19
4.3 Effects of the graph and the game
The fixation probability also depends upon the population structure more
generally over and above the mean temperature. For low h in particular the
heterogenous star graph, and to a lesser extent the paw, have a wider range
of fixation probabilities for differing values of v than any of the other graphs.
Note, however, that the line is less variable than the homogeneous well-mixed
population. This may be the effect of the temperature (note that the star
has the highest mean temperature as well as the widest range of fixation
probabilities), or the variance in the group size, or possibly both effects working
in conjunction.
A second observation that can be made on these graphs is that the ordering
of fixation probabilities for different graphs can change as the parameters vary.
For example, for the Hawk-Dove game with three vertices, whatever the value
of the reduced gain v, the fixation probability of the triangle and the line
cross for h ≈ 0.66 ≈ 10−0.18. Note that this approximately corresponds to the
point where the mean temperature gets higher on the triangle than on the
line. Similar observations are true for some (but not all) of the graphs (and
other games considered here), see Figure 12.
There are some features specific to the particular game in question. For the
Hawk-Dove game, the highest fixation probabilities can occur for intermediate
values of log(h) ≈ 0, both for Dove invaders and for Hawk invaders. This
is particularly the case for the square and the line. This occurs when the
reward value v is high for Hawk invaders, and the effect disappears for low
v. The figures are noticeably different for different graphs, and we can thus
say that there is a significant graph effect for the Hawk-Dove game. For the
Public Goods game these features do not appear, and we see eight broadly
similar figures. Thus for the Public Goods game, we can say that there is not
a significant graph effect, at least for the small graphs that we have considered.
The main features where the graphs differ is in the broader spread on the star
as mentioned above, and the dip in the fixation probability for intermediate
values of v.
5 Discussion
In this study we used the modelling framework described by Broom and
Rychta´rˇ (2012) to consider interactions of individuals in a non-homogeneous
environment. We have developed a birth-death dynamics for this framework
so that for the first time we can carry out a dynamic analysis. We note that
for evolutionary graphs, there is a wide variety of dynamic models consid-
ered including a number of common dynamics used, for example the invasion
process (Lieberman et al, 2005), BD-D process (Masuda, 2009), voter model
(Antal et al, 2006), DB-B process (Ohtsuki et al, 2006), and link dynamics
(Lieberman et al, 2005), see also Shakarian et al (2012); Allen and Nowak
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Fig. 11: Dependence of the fixation probability on v for h = 1.
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Fig. 12: Dependence of the fixation probability on the graph.
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(2014); De´barre et al (2014) for recent reviews. In a forthcoming paper we will
develop an equivalent range of dynamics for our framework.
We analysed and compared the dynamics of some simple games on dif-
ferent spatial structures and tried to determine some general features. The
aim was to look at the simplest possible cases in relation to this framework.
There are three key components of the model. One is the dynamics, as men-
tioned above. A second is the population structure which has a number of key
features; home fidelity, I-vertex temperatures, group size. Often conditioning
upon one or more of these features, the structure only has a secondary effect.
In particular the fixation probability was shown to be strongly correlated with
the mean temperature. Within the population, individuals play games, and
each game as well as being distinct, has specific features (in our case reward,
cost and baseline reward) which govern how well individuals do. The value of
the reward v was shown to have a potentially significant effect on the fixation
probability; the size of this effect depended upon aspects of the population
structure. In particular, a high mean temperature made the effect of this pa-
rameter much more critical, and the effect will be stronger when the graph is
highly heterogeneous, on the star for example.
The presented framework is set up in a way that given any graph structure
and any multi-player game, one can automatically generate a system of linear
equations yielding fixation probabilities. The results for graphs on 3 and 4
vertices are shown in this paper. The results for graphs on more vertices can
theoretically be obtained in a similar fashion. For some highly symmetrical
classes of graphs (such as complete graphs, or stars), the analysis can still
be performed even for large graphs, and such cases will be explored in an
upcoming paper. However, the system of linear equations grows exponentially
with the number of vertices (see Broom et al, 2010, for similar scenario) and
the number of possible graphs grows even faster (Harary and Palmer, 1973, p.
240) and the limits of these brute force numerical methods lie at around 9 or
10 vertices.
The two games that we consider, Hawk-Dove and the Public Goods game,
can be said to represent cooperative dilemmas, with the cooperative strategies
being Hawk and Cooperate, respectively. In our model, we see that for the cases
shown, the cooperative strategies generally do poorly. For the Public Goods
game, the fixation probability of a single Cooperator (Defector) is always less
(more) than 1/N . Similarly, for the Hawk-Dove game, the fixation probability
for a single Hawk is often greater than 1/N, although it can fall below this
value for small v. The fixation probability of a single Dove is often less than
1/N , although it can climb above this value for small v. One reason for this is
that the Invasion process, like birth-death processes in general, does not favour
cooperation (see e.g. Ohtsuki et al, 2006). Thus it may be that cooperation is
generally disfavoured in the Public Goods game. For the Hawk-Dove game, an
important factor could be the small size of the graphs used, which mean that
in turn the groups formed remain small. Large groups will tend to disfavour
Hawks, as they generate costs without rewards for all but one Hawk in any
group. Thus for larger graphs, we may obtain more cooperative behaviour,
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in the form of relatively higher fixation probabilities for Doves as opposed to
Hawks.
We note that we have made some assumptions about evolution in terms
of the dynamics as mentioned above. We have also assumed that in our birth-
death process the new offspring cannot replace a parent within the group (e.g.
if the parent kills and replaces another individual). If the offspring could re-
place the parent, then the denominator |G| − 1 in equation (4) would become
|G|. This changes the results slightly; most notably, it decreases the tempera-
tures as we would divide by larger numbers. However, the shapes of the curves
and the correlations are effectively as before.
The different graphs in our model can be considered to represent different
ways in which biological territories overlap. Alternatively our graphs can rep-
resent distinct social relationships within a group. While we only considered
small graphs, we believe that our results will generalise. As mentioned above,
mean temperature seems to be a more important factor than the specific struc-
ture. In the biological context, this represents a measure of interaction between
the individuals within the population. High mean temperature corresponds to
highly mobile individuals which interact potentially in larger groups than when
the mean temperature is low. This gives us a natural measure of the strength
of the effect of a particular game in a population. What’s more, temperatures
can be estimated in real populations, as long as the meetings between individ-
uals in groups can be reliably recorded, so that the frequency of the formation
of different groups can be estimated. It would be of great interest to work out
the temperatures in various real population scenarios, and to ascertain how
accurate our general conclusions are.
Finally we note that all of the populations in this paper correspond to
graphs, as we see in Figure 1(a). This is for ease of explanation only, and in
fact the framework of Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2012) allowed for a far greater
variety of population types. In subsequent work, we will consider a wider class
of populations, and in particular explore cases where there are more individuals
than places and so large groups of individuals can form.
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